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As TIF: Missouri’s Misguided Attempt to 
Reform Tax Increment Financing Deepens 
the Education Resource Gap 
Mark Ficken† 
Introduction 
As the old adage goes, “the road to Hell is paved with good 
intentions.” So too is with Tax Increment Financing (TIF) funding. 
Local municipalities intended that TIF would grant them greater 
control of their own economic development.1 Municipalities could 
incentivize development of so called “blighted” land without raising 
taxes.2 As federal funds were no longer flowing to cities, the idea of 
local control grew in popularity in the 1970s and 1980s,3 and forty-
nine states and the District of Columbia currently have TIF-
authorizing statutes.4  On its face, TIF appears to accomplish its 
stated goal of economic development—TIFs have been used to build 
affordable housing,5 revitalize neighborhoods,6 and develop 
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possible. I’d also like to thank my parents, brother, and friends for enduring my 
many rants, complaints, and explanations as I wrote this Note. And, as always, to 
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 1. Jeffrey I. Chapman, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool of Redevelopment, in 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAX AND LAND USE POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES: 
UNDERSTANDING THE LINKS 182, 182 (Helen F. Ladd & Wallace E. Oates eds., 1998). 
 2. Id. 
 3. J. Drew Klacik & Samuel Nunn, A Primer on Tax Increment Financing, in 
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND 
IMPACT 15, 18 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001). 
 4. Council of Dev. Fin. Agencies, TAX INCREMENT FINANCE STATE-BY-STATE 
REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF TRENDS IN STATE TIF STATUTES 2 (2015) [hereinafter 
STATE-BY-STATE REPORT]. 
 5. See Andrea Elson et al., Using TIF to Provide Affordable Housing: A Fiscal 
Impact Analysis of the King Park TIF District in Urbana, Illinois, in TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES, AND IMPACT 193, 193 
(Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001) (analyzing the use of TIF to redevelop 
an area in Urbana, Illinois). 
 6. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 2017 TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MISSOURI: 
LOCAL TIF PROJECT INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL DATA 607 (2018) (stating 
development at St. Charles Plaza at Noah’s Ark would be “for high density planned 
mixed use and commercial purposes”). 
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entertainment complexes.7 In the ensuing half-century, however, 
systematic flaws stemming from the vagueness of TIF statues led 
politicians of all political stripes to call for reform.8 
Missouri’s TIF statute was passed in 1982 and most recently 
amended in 2016.9  In 2018, the Missouri General Assembly 
considered a slate of commonplace and inventive reforms in 
Missouri House Bill 1236 (H.B. 1236).10 This bill died with the end 
of the 99th General Assembly, but the reforms were reintroduced 
with minor changes as Missouri House Bill 31 (H.B. 31) at the start 
of the new session.11 The most inventive proposed reform, H.B. 31, 
would amend Mo. Stat. 99.845(5) to allow school boards to “elect to 
have fifty percent of the portion of property tax revenue allocated to 
the school district by a county or municipality excluded from a tax 
increment allocation financing project . . . .”12 In essence, it would 
allow schools to opt-out of a proposed TIF district, thus withholding 
part of their budget from the TIF district pool.13 This seems 
reasonable; who doesn’t like stable, adequate public-school funding? 
However, a deeper look into the potential consequences of this 
reform shows it only exacerbates the problems this reform is meant 
to fix. School-opt out could effectively veto any TIF proposal, or force 
developers to craft their proposals solely with the school district in 
mind.14 In addition, it would further fracture regional development 
at a time when many agree regional unity is necessary.15 Finally, 
this opt-out power varies drastically depending on the financial 
 
 7. Id. at 265. 
 8. See, e.g., LINCOLN INST. OF LAND POLICY, IMPROVING TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING (TIF) FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 38 (2018) [hereinafter LINCOLN 
REPORT] (outlining the reform efforts regarding Chicago’s use of TIF districts). 
 9. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.1(2) (West 2016). 
 10. H.B. 1236, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 99.485(5) (Mo. 2018). 
 11. Compare H.B. 1236, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018), with H.B. 
31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019). 
 12. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 99.845.1(c)(5) (Mo. 2019). 
 13. Id. 
 14. See, e.g., Roxie Hammill, Shawnee Mission School Board Allows 
Meadowbrook TIF, KAN. CITY STAR (Sept. 7, 2015), https://www.kansascity.c
om/news/politics-government/article38071458.html [https://perma.cc/GV8A-ZJXM] 
(detailing how a TIF proposal was approved only after several concessions were made 
to the local school district). 
 15. See, e.g., Tim Logan, Area Stunts Growth by Feeding on Itself, ST. LOUIS 
POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 15, 2010), https://www.stltoday.com/business/local/area-
stunts-growth-by-feeding-on-itself/article_644ee8ee-d6da-57fc-9714-a7fb95619fa1.h
tml [https://perma.cc/MUM4-ZH6K] 
 (recounting the St. Louis region’s propensity to detrimentally compete for 
development deals). 
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stability of each school district.16 One of the few states with a 
similar TIF statute as Missouri’s proposal is bordering-state 
Kansas,17 where the mere threat of veto has radically changed TIF 
proposals.18 
Giving schools the chance to opt-out of TIF districts allows 
affluent schools to reap the benefits of TIF developments without 
the pain of a frozen budget during the life of the TIF. Meanwhile, 
distressed schools, like those in the Normandy School District, have 
no such luxury, needing to immediately attract any TIF 
development without regard for future economic impact. As such, 
this Note argues that the reforms proposed in H.B. 31 will 
accelerate the known consequences of the current TIF statute in 
Missouri. The Note will compare TIFs from the Kansas City, 
Kansas metropolitan region and the St. Louis, Missouri 
metropolitan region to show the potential impacts of school opt-out 
on the TIF decision-making process as well as any potential school 
resource impacts. 
This Note begins with a brief explanation on the focus on 
Missouri. Section II provides a primer on the history of TIF districts 
and how TIFs operate, while Section III introduces the proposed 
reforms within H.B. 1236 and H.B. 31 and places them in context 
with Kansas’ existing TIF statute. Section IV argues school opt-out 
provisions incentivize schools to only approve TIFs that benefit 
them and why that could actually lead to long-term economic 
distress and disparity. Section V argues that, even if it were prudent 
to grant schools veto power, school opt-out further and 
unnecessarily complicates the geopolitical tension of the St. Louis 
metropolitan region. Section VI briefly discusses the role of state 
aid in mitigating the losses suffered by schools while a TIF district 
is active and Section VII presents an alternative solution to the 
problem school opt-out attempts to solve. 
This Note proposes two reforms. The first modifies and 
expands the use and power of the county TIF commissions 
introduced in 2008, by redistributing who chooses members of the 
commission and weakening municipalities’ ability to veto their 
decision. The second implements school opt-out, albeit in a 
significantly narrower sense than that included in H.B. 31, by only 
allowing schools to opt-out of primarily residential TIF districts. 
 
 16. Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, Tax Increment Financing and Education 
Expenditures: The Case of Iowa, 9 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 515, 536 (2014). 
 17. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018). 
 18. Hammill, supra note 14. 
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I. Why Missouri? 
 
The Midwest in general, with the exception of California, more 
eagerly designates areas as TIF districts than any other region in 
the United States.19 While Missouri does not utilize TIFs nearly as 
much as neighboring Illinois,20 there are two characteristics to 
Missouri that make it more interesting to study. First, the St. Louis 
metropolitan area is wildly fragmented, which presents unique 
challenges to any TIF statute.21 At the same time, Missouri’s TIF 
statute currently typifies many across the country. Like many 
states,22 one way to achieve TIF district designation in Missouri is 
through a definitive finding of blight.23 In addition, Missouri 
authorizes these districts to last up to 23 years,24 which is near the 
length of an average TIF district in the United States.25 This 
tension between the unique fragmentation of the St. Louis 
metropolitan region and a relatively generic TIF statutory 
framework better exposes the limitations and flaws of TIFs in 
general and makes it easier to hypothesize any statutory change’s 
impact to the region. 
Second, and more importantly, Missouri legislators have 
expressed a sustained interest in reforming Missouri’s TIF statute, 
making it far more likely for Missouri to experiment with new 
proposals and mechanisms to accomplish TIF’s goals.26 The 
legislation at the heart of this Note is merely an example of this 
willingness to experiment.27 The ultimate question is whether the 
experiment will prove successful or disastrous. In the case of H.B. 
31, it is likely to be the latter. 
 
 19. Tanvi Misra, The Trouble with TIF, CITYLAB (Sept. 12, 2018), 
https://www.citylab.com/solutions/2018/09/the-trouble-with-tif/569815/ [https://per
ma.cc/N4ZL-6HKF]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Susan G. Mason & Kenneth P. Thomas, Exploring Patterns of Tax Increment 
Financing Use and Structural Explanations in Missouri’s Major Metropolitan 
Regions, 20 CITYSCAPE: A J. OF POL’Y DEV. & RES. 203, 207 (2018). 
 22. STATE-BY-STATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 5. 
 23. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 208. 
 24. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810.1(3) (West 2016). 
 25. STATE-BY-STATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 7. 
 26. E.g., H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019); H.B. 1236, 99th 
Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. § 99.485(5) (Mo. 2018); MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.1(2) 
(West 2016). 
 27. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019). 
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II. A Brief Primer on TIF Districts 
 
Before assessing how H.B. 31 would change Missouri’s TIF 
statute, it is important to understand the policy rationales behind 
TIFs as well as Missouri’s current statutory framework. Post-World 
War II, states desiring to redevelop urban areas and facilitate the 
expansion of the burgeoning suburbs encouraged land development 
through creative means. The states drove development of this 
solution, as the austerity measures of the Great Depression and 
wartime years led to a decline in federal funds for municipal 
economic development.28 In 1952, California, seeking the 
“elimination of blight and blighted areas” without resorting to the 
controversial and oft-litigated eminent domain, passed the first TIF 
statute.29 In the decades that followed, forty-eight states other than 
California and the District of Columbia passed TIF statutes,30 
primarily in response to a lack of federal funding.31 These TIF 
authorizing statutes vary broadly, but each utilize the same 
primary mechanism to fuel economic development.32 
A. How Do TIFs Work? 
TIFs are a classic redistribution scheme—municipalities 
preemptively take from government agencies and other services 
that receive property tax revenues (police, fire departments, and 
school districts) and funnel that prospective revenue into a fund to 
offset the cost of an approved development project.33 In practice, this 
redistribution is far more complex and depends on the standards 
and requirements put in place by each state’s TIF authorizing 
statute. For the sake of this section, however, many of these 
complexities are irrelevant and add confusion.34 Instead, this 
section provides a basic explanation on how TIF districts operate, 
and, because the focus of the Note is a proposed Missouri reform, 
 
 28. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 205. 
 29. Todd A. Rogers, A Dubious Development: Tax Increment Financing and 
Economically Motivated Condemnation, 17 REV. LITIG. 145, 164 (1998). 
 30. STATE-BY-STATE REPORT, supra note 4, at 2. 
 31. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 205. 
 32. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 3, at 17. 
 33. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
 34. The scope of this Note is only on a proposed TIF reform in Missouri that 
would allow school districts to opt-out of proposed TIF districts. The subtle nuances 
that govern TIF districts and other agencies receiving property tax revenues are 
beyond that scope. This Note will discuss the role of state aid to school districts in 
TIF districts in Section VI. 
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this explanation utilizes the applicable Missouri statutes, namely 
the Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act.35 
TIFs operate on two basic premises: (1) that property value 
will always increase and (2) economic development on that land 
accelerates that increase in value.36 Typically, property taxes are 
collected and divided among the various departments and districts 
in which the property resides.37 When a municipality passes an 
ordinance that designates a new TIF district, several things happen 
to that property tax revenue. First, a new district is drawn that is 
significantly larger than the approved redevelopment project.38 At 
that time, the property value of all the land comprising the new 
district is assessed.39 This assessment determines the “base value” 
of the TIF district.40 During this assessment, the municipality also 
determines the amount of property tax that base value generates 
and predicts the natural increase of property tax revenue over the 
life of the TIF.41 Then, any additional increase in property tax 
revenues beyond the predicted increase over the life of the TIF 
district (or, the incremental value) is set aside into a separate 
fund.42  This fund reimburses some or all of the redevelopment 
costs.43 
For example, St. Charles, Missouri approved a TIF on the site 
of a former restaurant and hotel in 2007.44 This TIF was to develop 
a multi-use entertainment district with apartments and 
restaurants.45 At the time the TIF was designated, the land valued 
$6.5 million.46 Ten years later and halfway through the project, the 
 
 35. MO. REV. STAT. § 99.800, et. seq. (West 2016). 
 36. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 6. 
 37. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 3, at 17. 
 38. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 6–7. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 7. 
 41. Chapman, supra note 1, at 183. 
 42. DENNY COLEMAN & BRIAN MURPHY, BETTER TOGETHER, ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 10 (2014). 
 43. Herein lies one major structural flaw with TIFs. In order for the TIF district 
to create enough of an incremental value to pay off the cost of the redevelopment, the 
land being redeveloped must already be of some value. This structural flaw, as 
Section IV explains, funnels TIF districts into affluent communities and 
neighborhoods. 
 44. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 6, at 607–08. 
 45. Rachel Kaatmann, Decision Looms for Noah’s Ark Project TIF in St. Charles, 
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 9, 2006), https://www.stltoday.com/suburban-
journals/decision-looms-for-noah-s-ark-project-tif-in-st/article_f6a8958c-e408-59e9-
b356-7e447dd54c45.html [https://perma.cc/JV5V-UYTG]. 
 46. Behind the Scenes: Economic Development in St. Charles, ST. LOUIS 
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land is valued at $88 million.47 All the increased property tax 
revenue caused by the rise in property value is placed into the TIF 
redevelopment fund to help finance the rest of the development. In 
addition, Missouri law allows up to fifty percent of all sales tax 
revenue generated by new economic activity in the TIF district to 
be placed into this redevelopment fund.48 
TIF districts last a long time. In Missouri, they can last up to 
twenty-three years.49 During those twenty-three years, the base 
value never changes and slows the economic growth of other 
districts, like schools, that depend on property taxes.50 These 
districts fail to see any of the increased revenue that comes with 
TIF redevelopment.51 Even worse, schools may see increased 
pressure on their existing budget if more individuals move into their 
district boundaries because of the TIF, thus increasing enrollment 
without increasing their budget.52 
TIF districts were and remain popular among municipalities 
for two main reasons. First, they allow significant local control over 
economic development projects.53 This local control allows 
municipalities to aggressively compete for new property and sales 
tax bases.54 Second, and perhaps more importantly, they are a 
 
BUSINESS JOURNAL (Apr. 21, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/news/201
7/04/21/behind-the-scenes-economic-development-in-st.html [https://perma.cc/2HH
N-F3D7]. 
 47. Id. 
 48. The statute provides that 
fifty percent of the total additional revenue from taxes, penalties[,] and 
interest which are imposed by the municipality or other taxing districts, and 
which are generated by economic activities within the area of the 
redevelopment project over the amount of such taxes generated by economic 
activities within the area of the redevelopment project in the calendar year 
prior to the adoption of the redevelopment project by ordinance, while tax 
increment financing remains in effect, [taxes exempt from this provision], 
shall be allocated to, and paid by the local political subdivision collecting 
officer to the treasurer or other designated financial officer of the 
municipality, who shall deposit such funds in a separate segregated account 
within the special allocation fund. 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.845.3 (West 2016). 
 49. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810.1(3) (West 2016) (“The estimated dates, which shall 
not be more than twenty-three years from the adoption of the ordinance approving a 
redevelopment project within a redevelopment area . . . .”). 
 50. Chapman, supra note 1, at 183. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See discussion infra Section IV.B. 
 53. Rachel Weber et al., The Effect of Tax Increment Financing on School District 
Revenues: Regional Variations and Interjurisdictional Competition, 40 ST. & LOC. 
GOV’T REV. 1, 28–29 (2008). 
 54. Id. 
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golden combination of what politicians love: they provide typically 
popular economic developments (who doesn’t love a new grocery 
store or movie theater?) without raising taxes.55 Yet TIFs also are 
inherently paradoxical. In order to see a high enough return on 
investment, municipalities must select projects not because the 
land is truly blighted but because the project promises some 
glistening new retail development. The City of St. Louis alone has 
more than 100 active TIF projects, and more than $2 billion of 
property tax revenue has been diverted into TIF-funded 
redevelopment projects.56 This activity is impressive considering 
the relative-youth of Missouri’s TIF authorizing statute.57 
III. Missouri Loves Company: Establishing the Link 
Between Missouri and Kansas 
 
This Section is divided into two subsections. The first 
introduces the reforms within H.B. 31. The second explains why 
Kansas provides an ideal analogue to Missouri, and therefore how 
example TIFs in Kansas can be used as evidence that school opt-out 
accelerates the already widening resource gap. 
A. H.B. 1236, H.B. 31, and Missouri’s Most Recent TIF 
Reform Effort 
In March 2018, the Missouri General Assembly considered a 
new slate of TIF reforms, focusing on three proposals. These 
reforms were later reintroduced with minimal changes in January 
2019 as H.B. 31. First, the proposal would cut the duration of TIF 
districts, limiting them at fifteen years, instead of the current 
twenty-three years.58 Second, it would modify the timing of the 
required notice and comment period—allowing residents within the 
proposed TIF district thirty days to voice concerns.59 Finally, it 
would implement the reform that is the topic of this Note: school 
opt-out. H.B. 31 would modify Mo. Stat. section 99.845 to allow 
applicable school boards to vote, with a two-thirds majority, to 
 
 55. See Chapman, supra note 1, at 184 (describing TIF funding as “self-
financing”). 
 56. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 (noting that, as of 2016, $2 billion of 
public tax dollars were diverted to developers through TIF). 
 57. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 6, 1–2. 
 58. Compare H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019), with MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 99.845.10(5) (West 2016). 
 59. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 67.1431.4 (Mo. 2019). 
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withhold half of their property tax revenue from the proposed TIF 
district.60 The previous iteration of this bill, H.B. 1236, was 
introduced with bipartisan sponsors and was voted out of committee 
before the bill died on the floor of the Missouri House of 
Representatives.61 
The reforms in these bills are fairly popular.62 More 
specifically, it was popular among everyone but the cities of St. 
Louis and Kansas City.63 St. Louis even sent a lobbyist to the state 
capitol in Jefferson City to argue against the bill.64 
B.  Jayhawkers and Bushwhackers; Not So Different 
Anymore 
This Note uses TIF districts in both Missouri and Kansas to 
add color to each of the supporting arguments of this Note’s thesis. 
These illustrative cases serve as easy-to-understand examples of 
arguments that delve into the intricacies of municipal land use. In 
order to determine whether school opt-out actually accelerates the 
resource gap among schools, it is important to eliminate as many 
variables as possible. Kansas, whose TIF statute includes school 
opt-out, is a perfect candidate.65 
  Missouri and Kansas have not always been the best of 
neighbors.66 Yet, the two states are sufficiently analogous 
demographically and economically to be a useful comparison.67 
 
 60. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 99.845.1(c)(5) (Mo. 2019). 
 61. H.B. 1236, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., (Mo. 2018) (showing the bill 
passed committee vote 8-2), https://house.mo.gov/BillContent.aspx?bill=HB1236&co
de=R&style=new&year=2018 [https://perma.cc/5N9D-8BLK]. 
 62. Sarah Fenske, TIF Reform Gets a Thumbs Up in House Committee, 
RIVERFRONT TIMES (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2
018/03/29/tif-reform-gets-a-thumbs-up-in-house-committee [https://perma.cc/2733-Q
FAY]. 
 63. Id. 
 64. This action was not well received. Sarah Fenske, St. Louis is Fighting TIF 
Reform in Jefferson City. That’s BS, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), 
https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2018/03/21/st-louis-is-fighting-tif-reform
-in-jefferson-city-that-should-make-us-mad [https://perma.cc/8M3Z-2B6H]. 
 65. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018). 
 66. Missouri residents, hoping to make Kansas a slave state, stormed Kansas 
when Kansas’ status as a free or slave state was to be determined by popular 
sovereignty according to the Kansas-Nebraska Act. The ensuing deadly conflict 
between the Bushwhackers (Missourians) and the Jayhawkers (Kansans) is known 
as Bleeding Kansas, Bleeding Kansas, KAN. HISTORICAL SOC’Y. (Sept. 2016), 
https://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/bleeding-kansas/15145 [https://perma.cc/3QPH-L
8HC]. Today this bloody conflict manifests itself through the (usually) bloodless 
rivalry between the University of Missouri and the University of Kansas. 
 67. Each state’s demographics are similar. U.S. Census QuickFacts on the 
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While some individual Missourians and Kansans may disagree, the 
U.S. Census Bureau lists both states as falling within the 
Midwestern region of the United States.68 Both states place a heavy 
emphasis on agriculture.69 In addition, each state’s demographics 
are similar.70 The political leanings of each state is not a major 
factor in this Note’s analysis, as TIF funding and reform is 
traditionally a bipartisan process.71 
C. The Relevant Difference Between Missouri and Kansas’ 
TIF Statutes 
Understandably, Missouri and Kansas utilize different 
procedures in designating TIF districts. However, only one of these 
differences is relevant. Under the procedures in Mo. Stat. section 
99.820, there is no opportunity for the school district to weigh in on 
the municipality adopting a new TIF district. Once the municipality 
adopts the TIF proposal, the school district’s funding is simply 
frozen for the life of the TIF.72 
Not so in Kansas. Under Kan. Stat. section 12-1771(d), school 
districts have thirty days after the required public hearing to veto 
any proposed TIF district.73 Ostensibly, this veto signals that the 
 
populations of Kansas and Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
quickfacts/fact/table/ks,mo/PST045218 [https://perma.cc/8N5G-ZAZ6]. The biggest 
difference between the two states is Missouri has a larger percentage of Black 
residents (11.8%) than Kansas (6.2%), whereas Kansas has a larger percentage of 
Latino residents (11.9%) than Missouri (4.2%). Id. This difference likely has little 
impact on the thesis, provided the demographics of the sample school districts align. 
The states are similar economically as well. The average income of Kansas is $55,477 
while in Missouri it is $51,542; further, the poverty rates are 11.9% and 13.4% 
respectively. Id. 
 68. CENSUS REGIONS AND DIVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, https://www2.censu
s.gov/geo/pdfs/maps-data/maps/reference/us_regdiv.pdf [https://perma.cc/P643-YV6
M]. 
 69. In a ranking by the Department of Agriculture of the fifty states by cash 
receipts by commodity, Kansas ranks 7th while Missouri ranks 12th. Cash Receipts 
by Commodity, State Ranking, 2017, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (Nov. 30, 2018), 
https://data.ers.usda.gov/reports.aspx?ID=17844 [https://perma.cc/D4AE-ZH3Z]. 
 70. U.S. Census QuickFacts on the populations of Kansas and Missouri, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/ks,mo/PST045218 [ht
tps://perma.cc/8N5G-ZAZ6]. 
 71. See H.B. No. 1434, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2016) (showing the bill 
passed 145-12 in the House and unanimously in the Senate). 
 72. Mo. Stat. section 99.820 outlines the procedures for a municipality to adopt 
a TIF proposal after the required public hearing in Mo. Stat. section 99.825. MO. 
ANN. STAT. § 99.820.1 (West 2016). 
 73. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018) (“No privately owned property subject 
to ad valorem taxes shall be acquired and redeveloped under the provisions of K.S.A. 
12-1770 et seq. [which outline the designation of the TIF district], and amendments 
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school district feels “that the proposed redevelopment district or 
bioscience development district will have an adverse effect on 
such . . . school district,” but there is no requirement that the school 
district disclose the reasoning behind their decision.74 While the 
phrasing of the Kansas statute and H.B. 31 are different, their 
impact should be similar.75 The means of vetoing may be different, 
but a veto is still a veto and there is still no TIF district. 
H.B. 31 allows the school district to prevent the inclusion of 
fifty percent of their property tax revenue from inclusion in the 
proposed TIF district.76 While this allowance is not the same as an 
explicit veto, the effects are the same. School districts tend to 
receive more property tax revenue than any other service,77 and, 
withholding such a substantial chunk of potential TIF funding 
would be detrimental to any TIF project. This result means that, 
while H.B. 31 does not explicitly give school districts the power to 
veto proposed TIF districts, it implicitly gives them that power. 
Therefore, while the power given to school districts under Kan. Stat. 
section 12-1771(d) is different than those given to school districts if 
H.B. 31 were enacted, the effect is the same. The impacts of this 
kind of power are relatively unknown. The rest of this Note uses 
examples of Kansas school districts merely threatening to veto TIF 
districts to illustrate potential impacts in Missouri. 
IV. School Opt-Out and H.B. 31 Incentivize Schools to 
Reject TIFs that Don’t Increase Property Tax Revenue 
 
It should come as no surprise that certain kinds of 
municipalities pursue different kinds of TIF projects.78 After all, a 
major rationale behind TIF districts was to allow municipalities to 
 
thereto, if . . . the board of education levying taxes on such property determines by 
resolution adopted within 30 days following the conclusion of the hearing for the 
establishment of the redevelopment district or bioscience development district 
required by subsection (b) that the proposed redevelopment district or bioscience 
development district will have an adverse effect on such . . . school district.”) 
 74. Id. 
 75. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018), with H.B. 31, 100th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 67.1431.4 (Mo. 2019). 
 76. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 67.1431.4 (Mo. 2019). 
 77. Daphne A. Kenyon, The Property Tax School Funding Dilemma, LINCOLN 
INST. LAND POLICY 4 (2007), https://www.lincolninst.edu/sites/default/files/pubfiles/t
he-property-tax-school-funding-dilemma-full_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/U8MD-6VMB]. 
 78. Sarah L. Coffin, The Promises and Pitfalls of TIF in the St. Louis 
Metropolitan Region: A Look at Neighborhood Disparities, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 57, 77–78 (2013). 
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pursue hyper-local funding to meet their individual needs in the 
face of declining federal money for redevelopment.79 This difference 
in the type of TIF pursued by municipalities is caused primarily by 
a difference in motive.80 Distressed municipalities tend to focus on 
single-use housing or residential redevelopment while more 
affluent municipalities focus on entertainment and multi-use retail 
developments.81 This difference makes sense. Affluent 
municipalities need no help getting middle- and upper-class 
residents to move within their borders. The allure of prestige and 
strong schools (and racially motivated homogeneity) draws these 
families like flies to a light.82 There is an economic interest in 
fighting off the smallest whiffs of blight or economic distress. 
Instead, these municipalities want to keep their residents (and 
their money) within their borders when they go grocery or clothes 
shopping, or when they decide to go to the movies or out to eat. 
A. The TIF Approval Process Already Favors the Voices of 
the Wealthy 
The Missouri TIF statute puts in place a lengthy process to get 
a proposal approved. This process is remarkably similar to formal 
notice-and-comment rulemaking.83 Unfortunately, this process 
already favors affluent municipalities. When a developer in 
 
 79. See Chapman, supra note 1, at 182. 
 80. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 78. 
 81. Id. at 73 (“The more distressed municipalities do appear to focus more of their 
TIF efforts on projects that promote residential uses, yet they also focus considerable 
attention to single use retail.”). Coffin’s 2013 article compared the City of St. Louis’ 
use of TIF with the surrounding St. Louis County. Id. at 78. She found that the City 
focused on housing redevelopments while the County focused on retail as “all 
communities around the region tend to depend on retail sales as a primary economic 
development strategy.” Id. at 73. One of Coffin’s conclusions was that “this finding 
indicates that the city of St. Louis is not competing with the surrounding 
municipalities in Missouri for TIF projects and that there is an opportunity for 
regional cooperation.” Id. at 78. The impact of factionalism in the St. Louis region on 
TIFs is discussed in detail in Section V. 
 82. Alana Semules, White Flight Never Ended, ATLANTIC (July 20, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/07/white-flight-alive-and-well/3
99980/ [https://perma.cc/BU6P-ZSKP] (“‘People know what is a white suburb and 
what is a black suburb,’ [Daniel] Lichter says. ‘Whites are still attracted to those 
suburbs that are white.’”). 
 83. Generally, under the guidelines set forth in Section 553 of the Administrative 
Procedure Act, agencies implementing new regulations or rules must: (1) provide the 
public notice of a proposed regulation or rule through publication, (2) accept written 
and, potentially, verbal feedback from the general public regarding the proposed 
rule, and (3) publish of the final rule at least thirty days before the rule is 
implemented. Administrative Procedure Act § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
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Missouri wants to begin a TIF-based redevelopment project, the 
developer presents a proposal to the municipality.84 This proposal 
outlines a basic description of the program, the proposed boundaries 
of the district, estimated costs, outside funding that might be 
necessary, and the expected duration of the TIF district.85 In 
addition, the plan must include a “cost-benefit analysis showing the 
economic impact of the plan on each taxing district . . . . The 
analysis shall show the impact on the economy if the project is not 
built, and is built pursuant to the redevelopment plan under 
consideration.”86  In theory, municipalities must demonstrate the 
TIF will actually increase property tax revenue in a worthwhile 
way. Finally, the proposal must explain why the TIF is necessary 
and what qualifies the land for TIF redevelopment under a “but for” 
test.87 This is notoriously easy to meet. All that must be 
demonstrated is that the specific developer presenting the proposed 
development would not undertake the project without the TIF 
funding.88 
i. The Missouri Blight and “But For” Tests Present No 
Barrier to a TIF’s Approval 
As referenced above, TIFs necessarily contain a paradox. They 
were originally used as a tool in the fight against blight, but the 
principles underlying each TIF district’s success requires 
municipalities to consider them primarily as a tool of economic 
development.89 Because of this paradox, the administration of TIFs 
are rife with opportunities for fraud and abuse.90 Much of the 
literature on Missouri’s TIF laws bemoans the almost non-existent 
blight and “but for” requirements.91 Recent TIFs in the St. Louis 
 
 84. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810.1 (West 2016). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. § 99.810.1(5). 
 87. Id. § 99.810.1(1) (requiring that the redevelopment area take place on a 
“blighted” area where economic redevelopment would not “reasonably be anticipated 
to be developed without the adoption of tax increment financing.”). 
 88. Joe Wilson, Given a Hammer: Tax Increment Financing Abuse in the St. 
Louis Region, 34 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 83, 91 (2014). 
 89. Chapman, supra note 1, at 183. 
 90. See id. at 185–88 (listing four potential issues that arise when municipalities 
use TIFs for economic development). 
 91. See Josh Reinert, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is It Time for Blight 
and But-For to Go?, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1019, 1050–51 (2001); Gil Williams, 
Specificity, Blight and Two Tiers of TIF: A Proposal for Reform of Tax Increment 
Financing Law, 33 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 255, 272–74 (2013); Wilson, supra note 
88, at 91–92. 
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region include the building of high-end lofts with an attached Whole 
Foods in the trendiest area of St. Louis City,92 a shopping center in 
an upper-middle class suburb,93 and the aforementioned 
entertainment, dining, and shopping destination complete with 
luxury apartments in St. Charles County.94 Drive twenty minutes 
away from any of these developments towards North St. Louis 
County and you enter the boundaries of the Normandy School 
District.95 Normandy made national news in the wake of the 
Ferguson unrest as the poster district for the resegregation of 
American public schools after the district lost its accreditation.96 
While Normandy has regained provisional accreditation,97 clearly 
TIFs are not being used to correct truly blighted areas and instead 
used to benefit already wealthy communities. 
 
 92. Tim Bryant, St. Louis Panel Approves TIFs for Apartments and Mercedes 
Dealership, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Oct. 31, 2012), https://www.stltoday.com/new
s/local/metro/st-louis-panel-approves-tifs-for-apartments-and-mercedes-
dealership/article_1a0c57f8-93d2-56c8-bb6c-1f65f52f948b.html [https://perma.cc/X9
5N-4W8B] (“Bruce Mills, the company’s president, told commissioners the City Walk 
on Euclid project will have 176 market-rate apartments on six floors above the Whole 
Foods grocery and a 458-car garage.”). 
 93. Laurie Skrivan, City of Manchester TIF Incentives Attract Wal-Mart, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 22, 2015), https://www.stltoday.com/news/multimedia/c
ity-of-manchester-tif-incentives-attract-wal-mart/image_1015d609-1794-59a1-b19c-
6b84dd554902.html [https://perma.cc/F9KA-7RT4] (“[Walmart] chose to reopen a 
larger store about a mile westward in the new Manchester Shopping Center due to 
the tax increment financing incentives (TIF) offered by the City of Manchester.”). 
 94. Kaatmann, supra note 45 (“Plans include an 18-story high-rise residential 
complex, an outdoor ice rink, a movie theater, a 150-room upscale hotel, restaurants 
and a parking garage that could include 1,827 spaces.”). 
 95. School Districts St. Louis County, Missouri, ST. LOUIS COUNTY, MO. (Sept. 
2013), https://www.stlouisco.com/Portals/8/docs/document%20library/maps%20and
%20gis/maps%20for%20download/School%20Districts.pdf [https://perma.cc/JRJ5-L
D59] [hereinafter School District Map]. 
 96. Nikole Hannah-Jones, School Segregation, The Continuing Tragedy of 
Ferguson, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/ferguson-
school-segregation [https://perma.cc/R2HW-85LC] (“The Normandy school district 
from which Brown graduated [the police killing of Michael Brown sparked the 
Ferguson protests] is among the poorest and most segregated in Missouri. It ranks 
last in overall academic performance. Its rating on an annual state assessment was 
so dismal that by the time Brown graduated the district had lost its accreditation.”). 
 97. Kristen Taketa, Normandy Schools Get Good News–And Provisional 
Accreditation, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Dec. 1, 2017), https://www.stltod
ay.com/news/local/education/normandy-schools-get-good-news-and-provisional-
accreditation/article_693d9b70-e821-5b76-9709-ca2e1c9d2901.html [https://perma.c
c/8CNL-UPVF] (revealing continuing issues with the district as “[l]ast school year, 
34[%] of Normandy students scored proficient or advanced on state tests in English 
and 19[%] did so in math, up from 24[%] and 12[%] respectively in 2015. Its four-year 
graduation rate increased from just 53.6[%] in 2013 to 81[%] this year.”). 
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Approved TIFs can be controversial, and this controversy 
frequently leads to litigation. However, Missouri courts at every 
level tend to defer to the judgment of the municipality.98 More 
extreme decisions claim that courts are not permitted to overturn 
the decision of the municipality unless the decision was 
“arbitrary.”99 There are procedural requirements before 
municipalities can establish TIF districts.100 Unfortunately, the 
decision of each municipality is de facto unreviewable by Missouri 
courts provided they follow the statutory requirements.101 This 
incentivizes bad behavior by developers.102 Instead of utilizing TIFs 
for their original purpose, developers can seize upon the 
“meaningless” blight standard and argue some of the most affluent 
and developed regions are actually blighted.103 
Some authors also focus on Missouri’s use of a but-for test 
when analyzing potential TIFs. This “but for” test, as explained 
above is fairly straightforward. The evidence needed to satisfy this 
test include: analyses of potential returns on investment, evidence 
of prior redevelopment efforts that stalled, or any other financial 
records or evidence that indicate the property is unlikely to be 
developed.104 Like the definition of blight, this fairly simple but-for 
test is open to abuses that the Missouri courts have yet to 
address.105 As Reinert noted, this standard makes it difficult to 
prevent a municipality from enjoining a TIF as “the plaintiff would 
 
 98. JG St. Louis West LLC v. City of Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 517 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2001) (“In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we make our own independent 
determination of whether the legislative body’s decision was fairly debatable.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 99. See, e.g., Crestwood Commons Redevelopment Corp. v. 66 Drive-In, Inc., 812 
S.W.2d 903, 910 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (“Judicial review is limited to whether the 
legislative determination was arbitrary or was induced by fraud, collusion or bad 
faith, or whether the City exceeded its powers.”). The issue of judicial review of each 
municipalities’ TIF approvals is not addressed in H.B. 31. See H.B. 31, 100th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019). 
 100. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.825 (West 2016) (outlining the procedural 
requirements for establishing a TIF district in Missouri). 
 101. Id. (omitting a provision for challenging the municipality decisions); see also 
Williams, supra note 91, at 265 (“The court must confine itself to determining if 
procedural mandates have been observed, necessary findings have been made, and 
whether the municipality’s ordinances are arbitrary . . . .”). 
 102. Id. at 273. 
 103. Id. at 272 (quoting Reinert, supra note 91, at 1050); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 91–94. 
 104. Reinert, supra note 91, at 1048. 
 105. JG St. Louis West LLC v. City of Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 520 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2001); Cory C. VanDyke, Fields of Dreams: The Expectation and Common Reality of 
Tax Increment Financing, 79 UMKC L. REV. 791, 805 (2011). 
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have to show that there was some evidence of fraud or misdealing, 
or that the finding of blight is ‘so arbitrary and unreasonable as to 
amount to an abuse of the legislative process.’”106 Thus, changes to 
TIF standards will not come from the courts; they must come 
through from the Missouri General Assembly. 
These lax blight and “but for” standards, in addition to 
economic considerations baked into TIFs, lead developers to forgo 
the areas TIF laws were meant to help and instead focus on areas 
with the largest return on investment.107 This abuse in turn 
prompts developers in affluent municipalities to focus on retail 
while economically distressed municipalities focus instead on 
housing.108 This effect is not necessarily bad; after all, the point of 
TIFs was to allow local control over economic development.109 
Developers look to find the best return on their investment and, 
naturally, focus on retail development.110 
An example of an affluent municipality focusing on 
entertainment and multi-use developments is the Meadowbrook 
Redevelopment Project in Prairie Village, Kansas.111 Meadowbrook 
was originally a golf course, but in 2016 was designated a TIF 
district.112 The approved project would redevelop the old golf course 
into a regional “park,” “luxury” housing ranging from single-family 
homes to assisted living for the elderly, and 5,000 square feet of 
commercial space.113 The designation of the Meadowbrook 
Redevelopment TIF was remarkably controversial and, as 
explained below, the school district for the proposed TIF district 
 
 106. Reinert, supra note 91, at 1048–49 (quoting Tierney v. Planned Indus. 
Expansion Auth. of Kan. City, 742 S.W.2d 146, 150 (Mo. 1988)). 
 107. Wilson, supra note 91, at 90 (citing Colin Gordon, Blighting the Way: Urban 
Renewal, Economic Development, and the Elusive Definition of Blight, 31 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 305, 317 (2004)). 
 108. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 78. 
 109. Klacik & Nunn, supra note 3, at 15. 
 110. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 217 (stating the majority of TIFs in the 
St. Louis suburbs tend to be retail establishments). 
 111. See Meadowbrook Redevelopment, CITY OF PRAIRIE VILLAGE, KAN., 
https://www.pvkansas.com/city-government/projects/meadowbrook-redevelopment 
[https://perma.cc/33DH-2E89]. 
 112. Id. 
 113. David Twiddy, Prairie Village Clears Path Toward Meadowbrook Park 
Reality, KAN. CITY STAR (Apr. 25, 2016), https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/c
ommunity/joco-913/northeast-joco/article73883787.html [https://perma.cc/2HXD-CS
RR] (discussing and detailing the City Council’s approval of the Meadowbrook TIF). 
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threatened to veto the project.114 The project was eventually 
approved and the district was created.115 
A natural reaction to this lax blight and “but for” standard is 
to call for either greater judicial oversight of the TIF approval 
process or a better statutory definition of what blight actually 
means. These options may be beneficial and would potentially 
remedy some of the issues identified in this Note. However, this 
Note does not advocate for this reform for two reasons. First, the 
focus of this Note is not on the maligned blight and “but for” 
standard, but rather on the impact of the proposed school opt-out 
provision in H.B. 31. Second, and more importantly, this Note 
advocates for more politically practicable reforms that remedy some 
of the issues created by these lax blight and “but for” standards.116 
Small municipalities and local control are deeply imbedded into the 
United States’ system of governance,117 and maintaining that 
system while advancing the need for regional governance is a tricky 
balance. The proposals advocated by this Note attempt to maintain 
that balance. 
ii. The County Commission Weighs In and Is (Potentially) 
Ignored 
After meeting the incredibly easy blight and “but for” 
standards as mandated by Missouri state law, certain counties 
appoint a commission with at least twelve members to conduct a 
study of the proposal.118 The statute attempts to allow interested 
parties to have representation on the commission. For example, two 
members of the commission are appointed by the school boards 
within the proposed TIF district.119 This commission then conducts 
a public hearing with specific notice requirements.120 At the hearing 
anyone can submit written or oral comments regarding the proposal 
 
 114. Hammill, supra note 14 (“Superintendent Jim Hinson told board members 
he would not recommend a veto of the financing . . . .”). 
 115. Id. 
 116. See discussion infra Section VII. 
 117. Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan 
Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) (“By shrinking the population 
denominator, boundaries give those remaining in the numerator that greater share 
of power and influence in the polity seen as crucial in increasing the propensity to 
participate. Boundaries, in other words, are what make possible the enhanced sense 
of citizen-effectiveness so essential for participation.”). 
 118. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.3 (West 2016). 
 119. Id. § 99.820.3(1)(c). 
 120. Id. § 99.825.1. 
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before the hearing and the hearing can be extended as long as 
necessary.121 
After the hearing, the commission votes on the proposal.122 
However, a rejection at this point is not binding.123 Finally, the 
municipality, through an ordinance, either denies  the request or 
approves it and establishes a new TIF district.124 Once this district 
is approved, more than one redevelopment project may be 
implemented within the approved district without undergoing the 
notice and comment period again.125 
iii. H.B. 31 Overinflates the Importance of School Boards in 
the TIF Approval Process 
Under H.B. 31, this process changes. After the municipality 
approves the TIF, the school board would have sixty days to 
determine whether they want to withhold fifty percent of their 
property tax revenue from the approved TIF district.126 This vote 
must pass the school board with a two-thirds majority and may 
occur any time before the municipality approves the TIF district.127 
H.B. 31 grants school boards far too much power in the TIF 
approval process and layers another approval vote over an already 
contentious and drawn out process. It is important to proceed with 
caution when spending public funds, but too much caution leads to 
gridlock and indecision. This Note instead proposes a different 
solution that would increase school district influence without 
allowing the school board to unilaterally kill a TIF proposal they do 
not like. School boards currently appoint two seats to the county 
commissions, which range from nine to twelve members depending 
on the size of the municipality.128 Instead, this Note argues, they 
should appoint four members to adequately represent the stake 
school districts have in any new TIF district. In addition, some of 
these seats should be filled by school districts classified as 
“distressed” by the Missouri General Assembly. This proposal gives 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. § 99.825.2. 
 123. Under section 99.825.2, if the commission rejects the proposal as a whole or 
in part, the municipality can override the commission with a two-thirds vote. Id. § 
99.825.2. 
 124. Id. § 99.820.1(1). 
 125. COLEMAN & MURPHY, supra note 42, at 11. 
 126. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. § 99.845.1(5) (Mo. 2019). 
 127. Id. 
 128. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.2(1) (West 2016). 
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schools more influence but keeps that influence in proportion to the 
potential impact any TIF has on their district. 
B. Affluent School Districts Will Focus on TIFs that 
Increase Tax Revenue 
Retail developments have a greater chance of increasing 
property tax revenue than residential developments.129 School 
districts know that. Municipalities know that. Developers know 
that. Allowing school districts to opt-out of TIF districts and 
effectively kill any project they do not like would allow school 
districts to assert their interests against the interest of the 
municipalities and developers. They could use their ability to veto 
or opt-out of a TIF development to allow only TIF developments that 
increase property tax revenue, and, by proxy, school district 
revenue, to a level of their choosing. That is not to say that school 
districts looking out for their interests would be an altogether bad 
thing. What it does mean, however, is developers and 
municipalities—faced with a school district threatening to opt-out 
of a potential TIF district—must craft their proposals with 
increased emphasis on the needs of a school district. 
Again, that is not necessarily a bad thing. Quality education is 
critical and a common criticism of TIF districts is that they 
unnecessarily strain the resources of schools without producing 
much benefit.130 What is more concerning is, as multi-use retail 
based TIFs tend to focus on more affluent areas, only affluent school 
districts have the option to assert their power and force negotiation 
for a more favorable TIF package. Simply put, it is a tool for the rich 
alone. 
Distressed municipalities have the opposite problem of 
affluent municipalities. They need residents, or, at the very least, 
they need to maintain their population in the face of families 
moving—typically to the more affluent municipality down the road. 
Of the two models of TIF development, the rationale used by 
distressed municipalities is more in line with the original intent of 
 
 129. See Rachel Weber, Equity and Entrepreneurialism: The Impact of Tax 
Increment Financing on School Finance, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 619, 620 (2003) (arguing 
that municipalities use “entrepreneurial strategies” to focus primarily on priorities 
outside of traditional “redistributive functions” like housing). 
 130. See Phuong Nguyen-Hoang, Tax Increment Financing and Education 
Expenditures: The Case of Iowa, 9 EDUC. FIN. & POL’Y 515, 536 (2014) (finding that 
“greater use of TIF is associated with reduced education expenditures.”). 
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TIF funding.131 TIFs that include affordable housing help attract 
new residents and provides a tax revenue increase, albeit smaller, 
that can stave off further distress. 
With the understanding that more economically distressed 
municipalities focus on residential TIFs, how then would allowing 
school districts to opt-out of proposed TIFs accelerate the resource 
gap between these schools? Two reasons: first, successful retail 
developments raise property tax revenue more than the building of 
an apartment or single-family home.132 Second, because distressed 
municipalities are focused on increasing their population with the 
approval of residential development TIFs, distressed school district 
enrollment would increase, and this increase could outpace any 
increase in revenue the school would receive when the TIF 
expired.133 More affluent schools with stagnant enrollment will 
have more resources due to increased property taxes, while 
distressed districts will enroll more students with less of a property 
tax increase simply based on the type of TIF each area pursues. 
Some states, like Minnesota, allow school districts to formally 
veto a proposed TIF district if the proposed district involves housing 
redevelopment.134 A similar scheme can be implemented in 
Missouri as well. As explained above, TIFs for housing development 
are primarily centered in distressed municipalities.135 This means 
a provision modeled after Minnesota’s would give the power to opt-
out of TIFs primarily to distressed school districts—the reverse of 
what might happen if H.B. 31 were enacted. This reversal also 
prevents the widening of the resource gap. Instead of funneling 
much needed resources into a TIF district, the Normandy School 
District, for example, could use that money to provide counseling to 
students suffering the effects of trauma, grant stability to students 
constantly in transition—be it from home to home or district to 
district—and continue increasing the academic standards of the 
district. These are all goals articulated by the district.136 Tailoring 
a school opt-out provision to only apply to TIFs traditionally within 
 
 131. See Chapman, supra note 1, at 182. 
 132. See Weber, supra note 129, at 620. 
 133. See id. at 634. 
 134. MINN. STAT. § 469.176, subd. 4c(d)(3) (2019). 
 135. Coffin, supra note 78, at 77–78. 
 136. See Charles J. Pearson, Opinion, In Normandy District, All Our Children 
Deserve the Best, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 20, 2018), https://www.stltoday.co
m/opinion/columnists/in-normandy-district-all-of-our-children-deserve-the-best/
article_17c18eb8-b3d1-5ef3-9c64-d6f00ebfff71.html [https://perma.cc/CE8G-UNU4]. 
Pearson is the superintendent of the Normandy School District. Id. 
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their borders allows them to stabilize their financial resources and 
pursue those goals. 
TIFs are, and always have been, about power and the transfer 
of power to different communities. Originally, TIFs took power 
usually reserved for the federal government and returned it to state 
and local governments.137 Local governments controlled their own 
redevelopment plans without much external influence. In the 
ensuing half-century, however, this power has been co-opted by 
wealthy developers looking to funnel TIF funds into grand multi-
use redevelopments in already economically stable and affluent 
areas.138 This practice runs afoul of the original intent of TIF 
funding and is made possible through vague and malleable approval 
standards. 
i. School-Opt Out Takes that Power and Amplifies It 
Further 
School districts facing a new TIF development have a baked-
in incentive to maximize their return on their forced investment in 
the TIF district. There is evidence that not all TIF districts 
guarantee school district revenue will increase in any substantial 
way.139 This result is especially true in more suburban or rural 
school districts.140 Scholars have argued school opt-out, like that 
proposed in H.B. 31, fails to consider the simple fact that a TIF’s 
“effect is not consistent across the board.”141 This opt-out gives 
schools the incentive to ensure their concerns are noted and 
considered throughout the TIF approval process, and, in states that 
allow it, opt-out of the TIF district if these concerns are not 
addressed. In theory this practice should apply to all school 
districts, both affluent and distressed. Yet, as explained above, 
developers’ economic goals must be met as well. As such, larger TIF 
districts with greater returns on investment tend to pop up in more 
affluent regions.142 It is impossible for distressed school districts to 
oppose proposed TIF districts if few developers want to begin a TIF 
development within their district. While school opt-out nominally 
applies to all school districts regardless of economic health, 
practically, it is only a tool for affluent districts. 
 
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 28–31. 
 138. See supra text accompanying notes 89–97. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Weber et al., supra note 53, at 35–36. 
 141. Id. at 39. 
 142. Coffin, supra note 78, at 78. 
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ii. Kansas Schools Have Been Eager to Use Their Veto 
Power 
The Meadowbrook Redevelopment TIF provides an example of 
an affluent school district using the clout of a potential veto to seek 
a more favorable TIF development plan. Meadowbrook sits within 
the district boundaries of Shawnee Mission, an affluent school 
district primarily in Johnson County that encompasses part of 
fourteen municipalities to the southwest of Kansas City.143 The 
district is predominately White.144 As of late, Shawnee Mission has 
become more willing to exercise, or at the very least threaten use of, 
their power under Kan. Stat. section 12-1771(d).145 This veto threat 
was the case during the approval of the Meadowbrook 
Redevelopment TIF. Then superintendent Jim Hinson stated the 
district would oppose any TIF development that would “drive up 
enrollment and put a strain on the district’s budget . . . .”146 
The school district eventually relented and allowed the 
Meadowbrook Redevelopment, as well as other development 
projects, to proceed.147 However, in order to gain the school district’s 
support, the developers negotiated with the school district.148 These 
negotiations ensured the TIF would end as soon as the financing for 
the park was paid off, which developers expect to be sooner than the 
approved twenty years.149 In addition, developers left open the 
possibility of an “environmental lab” in the park for use by district 
schools.150 These concessions from the developer highlight that only 
an affluent school district like Shawnee Mission has the ability and 
clout to utilize the power under section 12-1771(d) of the Kansas 
Code.151 
 
 143. About, SHAWNEE MISSION SCH. DIST., https://www.smsd.org/about [https://p
erma.cc/LLD6-PN83] (“The district is consistently ranked among the finest school 
districts nationwide for its high student performance. Shawnee Mission serves a 
diverse student population from 14 cities within northeast Johnson County, 
Kansas.”). 
 144. See Education Demographics and Geographic Estimates, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
EDUC. STAT., https://nces.ed.gov/Programs/Edge/ACSDashboard/2011640 [https://p
erma.cc/8S2P-WYUY] (stating that the Shawnee Mission School District is 81% 
White). 
 145. See Hammill, supra note 14. (noting that the Shawnee Mission School 
District had met twice to discuss vetoing a TIF). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018). 
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To be fair, some Missouri schools have used their clout to 
pressure developers of proposed TIF districts for more favorable 
development plans.152 For example, in St. Charles, a middle-class 
suburb to the northwest of St. Louis, the St. Charles School District 
raised concerns about increased enrollment due to a twenty-seven-
acre proposed TIF development near the banks of the Missouri 
River.153 To assuage concerns, representatives of both the city TIF 
commission as well as the developer of the site met with school 
board officials to understand their concerns and seek their input.154 
The St. Charles School District’s actions arguably undermine the 
thesis of this Note as it shows school districts in Missouri are 
already using their clout to seek more desirable TIF developments, 
therefore rendering Missouri H.B. 31 useless.155 
Yet this argument misses the point. This Note argues that 
Missouri H.B. 31 would accelerate the resource gap between 
affluent and distressed school districts.156 It is one thing for the St. 
Charles School District to raise concerns about a proposed TIF 
development without any real power to do something about it. It is 
another thing altogether for the school district to threaten to opt-
out of the TIF development completely. Further, if Missouri school 
districts could opt-out of TIF districts, it would be reasonable to 
assume more school districts would follow the lead of the St. Charles 
School District and be more vocal about their concerns. 
C. Distressed Municipalities Focus on TIFs that Increase 
Population Without Increased School Funding 
Less consequentially, as distressed municipalities are focused 
on residential TIFs, the number of students in distressed school 
districts will increase.157 This increase in enrollment will likely 
outpace any increase in school funding through increased property 
tax revenue. As stated above, more distressed municipalities tend 
to focus on residential development.158 These distressed 
municipalities aim to use TIFs to either ease a trend of people 
 
 152. Kaatmann, supra note 45. (“[T]he developer would give the St. Charles 
School District $1.25 million in lieu of new tax revenue that would be diverted to the 
TIF fund.”). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. H.B. 31, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019). 
 156. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
 157. This is a concern for affluent schools as well. 
 158. Coffin, supra note 78, at 77–78. 
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moving out of the municipality, or, more importantly, attract new 
residents. At least some of these new residents will likely have 
school-age children, thus increasing enrollment. 
The concern for increased enrollment was part of the reason 
Shawnee Mission threatened to veto the Meadowbrook TIF.159 This 
increase in enrollment because of a residential TIF development 
comes at a time when school funding is frozen. This means that 
schools must do more with the same amount of revenue. This might 
not impact affluent schools, but for distressed schools barely 
hanging on it could lead to disastrous consequences.160 While 
affluent school districts see their revenues increase without any 
corresponding enrollment increase, distressed schools might see 
their revenues increase while their enrollment increases. Assuming 
that school opt-out is practically a tool for affluent school districts 
alone, these distressed districts are unable to adequately assert 
their economic needs while affluent districts are able to haggle with 
developers.161 This, again, would grant economic power to affluent 
school districts at the expense of distressed districts, further 
accelerating the resource gap. 
V. Missouri H.B. 31 Fails to Address Regional Division and 
the Underlying Structural Problems of Missouri’s TIF 
Statute 
As explained in the section above, TIFs generally exacerbate 
the resource gap between affluent and distressed school districts.162 
A second argument against the proposed school opt-out in Missouri 
H.B. 31 is that the proposal simply layers another decision-making 
body on top of the already complex and fractured TIF approval 
process, while ultimately doing nothing to address this byzantine 
maze. 
A. The Mini-Municipality Problem 
This Note focuses on TIF use in Missouri, and, in particular, 
the St. Louis metropolitan area. This is for two reasons. First, the 
 
 159. Hammill, supra note 14 (noting that Superintendent Hinson said that the 
financing arrangement will increase enrollment, straining the school district’s 
budget). 
 160. See Weber, supra note 129, at 634 (stating that school districts “starting off 
with more poor children enrolled in a district slows the growth in property tax 
revenues” that come with a TIF redevelopment). 
 161. See discussion supra Section IV.B.i. 
 162. See discussion supra Section IV.B. 
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St. Louis region utilizes TIFs far more than anywhere else in the 
state.163 Second, the proposed changes to Missouri’s TIF statute 
would have the greatest impact on the St. Louis region. This is 
primarily due to St. Louis’ mini-municipality problem. After the 
City of St. Louis split from St. Louis County during political 
uncertainty following the Civil War, small municipalities began 
popping up throughout the region.164 The number of municipalities 
peaked at ninety-eight in 1952 and has since fallen to eighty-
eight.165 This may not seem that extreme, but, in comparison, 
Johnson County, Kansas (where Kansas City, Kansas is located) 
contains twenty municipalities in only a slightly smaller area.166 
In an effort to increase their tax bases, these small 
municipalities must fight with each other to attract new developers. 
Recognizing that anything can be considered “blighted” under 
section 99.810.1(1) of the Missouri Code, municipalities turn to 
TIFs.167 Far too often, Luce explains, municipalities view TIFs as a 
“zero-sum” competition—if I get the new Walmart development 
then my neighbor will not.168 This fuels unnecessary competition 
 
 163. THOMAS LUCE, RECLAIMING THE INTENT: TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN THE 
KANSAS CITY AND ST. LOUIS METROPOLITAN AREAS 12 (2003). 
 164. See St. Louis County Sees Dwindling Number of Municipalities, U.S. NEWS 
& WORLD REP. (July 1, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/missour
i/articles/2018-07-01/st-louis-county-sees-dwindling-number-of-municipalities [http
s://perma.cc/9L3S-2PTK], and Tim O’Neil, Aug. 22, 1876: How the “Great Divorce” of 
St. Louis City and St. Louis County Started, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Aug. 22, 
2016), https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/aug-how-the-great-divorce-of-st-louis-
city-and/article_3e93fa29-7d01-570d-94f2-31eca08a9378.html [https://perma.cc/RD
8L-UMUA]. Post-Civil War, the City of St. Louis was growing at a much faster pace 
than the rest of St. Louis County. To avoid county taxes and “redundant” 
government, the City proposed becoming independent. Id. After going to the polls, 
and then to court to contest supposed irregularities, the measure passed. Id. At the 
time the City was economically superior. Id. Today, after several failed attempts at 
reconciliation, the City is attempting to rejoin St. Louis County. Jack Grone, City, 
Meet County: St. Louis Weighs Historic Merger, CITYLAB (Jan. 30, 2019), 
https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/01/st-louis-missouri-city-county-consolidation-
vote-2020/579436/ [https://perma.cc/5ULV-AT3Y]. For a whole host of reasons (many 
economic, but also racial) County citizens are vehemently opposed to such a merger. 
Id. 
 165. St. Louis County Sees Dwindling Number of Municipalities, supra note 164. 
 166. Johnson County, Kansas has an area of 477 square miles. Fast Facts, 
JOHNSON COUNTY KAN. (2018), https://www.jocogov.org/government/about-johnson-
county/fast-facts [https://perma.cc/G53P-7XKG]. St. Louis County, Missouri has an 
area of 507 square miles. U.S. Census QuickFacts on St. Louis County, Missouri, 
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/stlouiscountymissouri [htt
ps://perma.cc/ML5V-GT45]. 
 167. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.810.1(1) (West 2016); LUCE, supra note 163, at v. 
 168. LUCE, supra note 163, at v. 
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between municipalities and only serves to further fracture the 
region. 
These mini-municipalities are so small that the “copycat” 
syndrome that so-often plagues states with TIF statutes is made 
even worse.169 Briffault likened this copycat syndrome to the 
political science classic Prisoner’s Dilemma.170 It is in the region’s 
best interest if each municipality coordinates with each other 
regarding economic development. This cooperation ensures that 
municipalities receive necessary property tax revenue while 
preventing unnecessary competition over proposed redevelopment 
projects. Regional cooperation would also cull the race to the bottom 
wherein municipalities offer unsustainable, unreasonable, and 
unpopular incentives along with the proposed TIF district to entice 
companies to move within their borders.171 
Redevelopment, for good or (mostly) for ill, is seen as a zero-
sum game.172 One store usually can service the needs of several 
municipalities. This is especially so the more fractured the region 
is. The market simply cannot support a Walmart or Target in each 
of the eighty-eight municipalities in St. Louis County, but can 
reasonably support around a dozen stores.173 The competition for 
these stores leads to humorous results. In 2010, a Walmart location 
straddling the boundary of St. Ann and Bridgeton moved two miles 
 
 169. Richard Briffault, The Most Popular Tool: Tax Increment Financing and the 
Political Economy of Local Government, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 65, 90 (2010) (“Even if it 
is not clear how well TIF works, if other localities are already using it, any locality 
also interested in promoting tax base growth is likely to be drawn to it, and to use it 
in areas where it is most likely to add to the tax base.”). 
 170. Id. at 92. The Prisoner’s Dilemma is a political science thought experiment 
illustrating that two rational actors will not necessarily cooperate with each other 
even when it is in their best interests to do so. Jim Chappelow, Prisoner’s Dilemma, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/prisoners-dilemma.asp [htt
ps://perma.cc/R9AT-939P]. 
 171. While not directly analogous, look only to Wisconsin’s ludicrous tax rebate 
offer to Foxconn for their U.S. headquarters. Andrew Liptak, Foxconn Might Slow 
Hiring at its Wisconsin Plant, VERGE (Jan. 19, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/
2019/1/19/18189480/foxconn-wisconsin-plant-possible-hiring-slowdown-jobs [https://
perma.cc/8VZ6-ZN78]. 
 172. LUCE, supra note 163, at v. 
 173. There are currently ten Target stores and ten Walmart stores in St. Louis 
County. Number of Target locations in St. Louis County, Missouri, GOOGLE MAPS, 
http://maps.google.com (follow the hyperlink, then search “Target near St. Louis 
County, Missouri” and then count the number of Target stores within the boundaries 
of St. Louis County) [https://perma.cc/WHX5-4XG8]; Number of Walmart locations 
in St. Louis County, Missouri, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow 
hyperlink, then search “Walmart near St. Louis County, Missouri” and then count 
the number of Walmart stores within the boundaries of St. Louis County) 
[https://perma.cc/CU26-MN8N]. 
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down the road to a new location completely within Bridgeton.174 The 
impetus for the move? Bridgeton set up a TIF in the new location.175 
School districts, especially in the St. Louis region, necessarily 
overlap municipal boundaries. The above-described Walmart 
moved from one municipality to another but remained within the 
boundaries of the Pattonville School District.176 The Pattonville 
School District could not care less which municipality has the 
nearest Walmart, and the infighting between the two 
municipalities cost the district millions of dollars over the life of the 
TIF.177 This infighting lead one municipality to offer TIF funding to 
lure the Walmart fully within their borders,178 which led to less 
money being directed to the school district. 
To be fair, many of these smaller municipalities in St. Louis 
County are relatively inconsequential. For example, the city of 
Champ, Missouri boasts thirteen residents179—hardly making it a 
redevelopment juggernaut. However, the sheer number of 
municipalities fuels factionalism in the region and intensifies the 
competition for big box stores, shopping malls, and office space.180 
Overlay one school district’s boundary lines, which in St. Louis 
County necessarily contains pieces of sometimes as many as a dozen 
municipalities,181 and you are left with a school district being held 
hostage as municipalities race to the bottom in order to score a new 
development through TIF funding. While TIFs already cause 
conflict over what is typically seen as a zero-sum game,182 the sheer 
number of actors in the St. Louis region intensify this 
competition.183 Any TIF reforms in Missouri must take this mini-
municipality problem into account. Missouri already attempted to 
 
 174. Logan, supra note 15. 
 175. Id. 
 176. District Boundaries, PATTONVILLE SCH. DIST, https://www.psdr3.org/district 
[https://perma.cc/M2DC-7ZDX]. 
 177. MO. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 2016 TAX INCREMENT FINANCING IN MISSOURI: 
LOCAL TIF PROJECT INFORMATION AND FINANCIAL DATA 108–09 (2017) (listing the 
amount of revenue in the Manchester Highlands TIF fund as $7,892,078.00). 
 178. Logan, supra note 15. 
 179. U.S. Census Community Facts for Champ, Missouri, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
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 180. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 61; Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 55. 
 181. Interactive Map of the Parkway School District, PARKWAY SCH. DIST., http://
www.pkwy.k12.mo.us/map/parkway_Map.cfm [https://perma.cc/6CKF-KMVD]. 
 182. See LUCE, supra note 163, at v. 
 183. Logan, supra note 15. 
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do this through the establishment of the county TIF commissions,184 
but these commissions have fatal flaws that undermine their 
positive benefit.185 
B. Missouri House Bill 1, Missouri House Bill 1434, and 
Missouri’s Attempt to Rectify the Mini-Municipality 
Problem 
In spite of growing bipartisan calls to reform Missouri’s 
underlying TIF statutes, the Missouri General Assembly has been 
slow to address the serious concerns regarding the lax TIF 
standards outlined above. To date there have been two major TIF 
reform bills passed in Missouri since the original bill was passed in 
1982.186 The Missouri General Assembly passed House Bill 1 (H.B. 
1) in 2008, which attempted to provide additional oversight and 
stifle the growing competition for TIF redevelopment projects 
between municipalities.187 The bill took the power to appoint TIF 
commissions out of the hands of municipalities in three counties (St. 
Louis, St. Charles, and Jefferson) and created county-wide 
commissions instead.188 The rationale appears sound—a county-
wide commission has no allegiance to a specific municipality and 
should approve TIFs that have the greatest positive impact on the 
region as a whole. This plan, however, had serious shortcomings. 
The most serious—the municipality’s veto power—was briefly 
explained above in the procedural requirements to approve a TIF 
district.189 After the commission makes their recommendation, 
municipalities can veto their findings with a two-thirds vote.190 
Municipalities have not been shy in exercising this override 
power.191 What is the point of a county-wide TIF commission if you 
allow the municipality to simply override any decision they make 
with an easily attainable majority? As Coleman and Murphy 
explain, the average number of members in a municipality’s 
 
 184. See discussion supra Section IV.A.ii. 
 185. Id. 
 186. H.B. 1, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2008); H.B. 1434, 98th Gen. 
Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2016); H.B. 1600, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. (Mo. 2016). 
 187. Mo. Governor’s Message (June 29, 2016). 
 188. H.B. 1, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. §§ 99.820.2(7)–(8) (Mo. 2008). 
 189. See Hammill, supra note 14. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Mason & Thomas, supra note 21, at 227 (“The city of Ellisville did override 
the county TIF Commission in 2012 adopting an $11 million TIF for a Wal-Mart 
store.”). 
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governing body in St. Louis County is six.192 To attain a two-thirds 
majority, all the average municipality needs are four votes instead 
of the usual three. And this vote would “override a 9- or 12-person 
panel charged with watching over interests larger than those of a 
single county or municipality.”193 Yet, ten years after this reform 
was passed, there has been no new legislation significantly 
reforming this veto system, even as calls for abolishing this veto 
power—by academics and politicians alike—have grown.194 
Second, and more substantially, in 2016, Missouri House Bill 
1434 (H.B. 1434) authorized consequences for municipalities that 
went against the recommendation of the county-wide TIF 
commission.195 These punishments are relatively severe and were 
passed with widespread bipartisan support.196 If a municipality 
overrides the TIF commission’s rejection, the TIF funding will be 
limited to “acquisition of land and other property, real or personal, 
or rights or interests therein . . . [d]emolition of buildings; and [t]he 
clearing and grading of land.”197 These restrictions greatly limit 
where TIF money can go and, in theory, should prevent 
municipalities from simply overriding the county TIF commissions 
without recourse. Because this reform is still relatively new, it is 
hard to study its impact, but there are some signs the reforms are 
effective. The Municipal League of St. Louis, which represents most 
municipalities in St. Louis County, opposed this reform, stating it 
would usurp the power of municipalities and undermine the 
original intent of TIF funding.198 Yet, that seems to be the point. 
This reform might address the issues of competition that authors 
like Weber believe “strain[s] interjurisdictional relations because it 
grants one taxing body (the municipality) the authority to deny 
 
 192. COLEMAN & MURPHY, supra note 42, at 11. 
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 194. COLEMAN & MURPHY, supra note 42, at 11–12; Mason & Thomas, supra note 
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other taxing bodies access to new property value growth.”199 This 
Note argues, and some concur,200 that no TIF reform is more 
important than further curtailing municipalities’ veto power. 
C. Missouri H.B. 31 Attempts to Solve This Issue, but Once 
Again Misses the Mark 
Proponents of the reforms in H.B. 31 argue this is exactly the 
situation that school opt-out is meant to rectify. Yet, looking at the 
history of TIF laws in Missouri shows this is a misguided 
assumption. To see this, one only needs to look to the other veto 
already in place.201 Municipalities already have the power to veto 
the decision of the county TIF commissions with a two-thirds vote 
of the city council.202 While there are consequences in place for 
municipalities that exercise this option, this veto power has been 
widely criticized and other papers have called for its elimination.203 
The goal of the county TIF commissions was to curb unnecessary 
competition between small, symbiotic municipalities by placing 
some of the TIF decision making process in the hands of a regional 
body. There, the commission could consider regional factors and 
utilize TIFs in a way more in line with their original intent. These 
commissions were also designed to comprise representatives from 
all concerned parties.204 
If there are calls to abolish the veto power of municipalities, it 
therefore makes little sense that, in order to reform Missouri’s TIF 
system, the state needs to expand the use of one of the most 
maligned aspects of the current statutory scheme to schools.205 This 
can lead to one of two situations. 
 
 199. Weber et al., supra note 53, at 37. 
 200. See Nguyen-Hoang, supra note 130, at 537 (suggesting reforming TIF 
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suggested that these county TIF Commissions should be strengthened to make it 
even more difficult for a city to adopt a TIF proposal that the commission has ruled 
against.”). 
 
2020] As TIF 137 
First, if H.B. 31 is adopted it would layer another map of school 
district boundaries on top of the municipal map. This in turn would 
lead to increased fracturing of the region, which can only make the 
mini-municipality problem worse.206 There is an argument that this 
would require the building of greater consensus and this kind of 
system—with municipalities and schools able to check each other 
and the county commission—encourages more mundane TIF 
districts. However, this consensus must come on a regional (either 
county or joint-county) level. This kind of system might work in a 
more unified region with fewer municipalities and school districts, 
but given the sheer number of municipalities and school districts, 
this layering will simply pit municipalities against the county, or 
against school districts and so on.207 If the factionalism built into 
Missouri’s TIF scheme fuels the resource gap between affluent and 
distressed schools, increased factionalism will make it worse. 
An example TIF from Missouri that illustrates this 
conundrum is the Manchester Highlands TIF.208 In 2005, the City 
of Manchester, Missouri, designated the “Highway 141/Manchester 
Road Redevelopment Area.” This TIF was ultimately approved 
because the “[p]roject had unusual/extraordinary costs that made 
the project financially unfeasible in the market place [and] required 
significant public infrastructure investment.”209 The Manchester 
Highlands TIF poached a Walmart from a different municipality a 
few miles away.210 In addition to the Walmart, there are several 
other big box and multi-use stores, including a Nordstrom Rack and 
Best Buy.211 As of publication, there are seven years left before the 
TIF district expires.212 
This TIF district sits within the boundaries of the Parkway 
School District that is fairly analogous to the Shawnee Mission 
School District discussed in the subsection above. Parkway School 
District primarily covers the St. Louis suburbs of Chesterfield, 
Creve Coeur, Manchester, Maryland Heights, and Town and 
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Country.213 Each of these suburbs is located in what is colloquially 
called “West County,” a well-to-do business hub of the St. Louis 
region.214 The district is primarily White (80%), with a sizeable 
Asian student population (9%) as well, and a median household 
income of $115,947 for households with children in public school.215 
The Manchester Highlands TIF was not approved without 
controversy.216 As the TIF was approved in 2005 and later amended 
in 2007, the county TIF commissions were not yet in place.217 
However, the controversy over the Manchester Highlands TIF 
approval illustrates how a fractured region leads to unnecessary 
competition and animosity. 
Second, allowing school districts to opt-out—and essentially 
kill TIF projects—negates any improvement that could be made by 
eliminating municipalities’ ability to veto the county TIF 
commission’s recommendations. While not nearly as numerous as 
the number of municipalities in St. Louis County, there are still 
twenty-four school districts within the county boundaries.218 Even 
worse, some school districts like the Parkway School District cover 
wide swaths of land while others like the Bayless School district 
cover small parcels of land.219 Any increase in regional cooperation 
brought about by removing the municipal veto would simply be 
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acquisitions.”). 
 217. H.B. 1 was passed in 2008. H.B. 1, 94th General Assemb., 1st Sess. §§ 
99.820.2(7)–(8) (Mo. 2008). 
 218. School District Map, supra note 95. 
 219. Id. 
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absorbed by the school districts if they gain the ability to opt-out of 
any proposed TIF. 
VI. State Funding Fails to Fill in the Gaps Left by TIF 
Districts 
 
Before addressing any proposed solution, it bears quick 
mention of one complicating factor not addressed thus far in this 
Note. Many states, but not Missouri, allow for increased school aid 
to fill in the funding gaps left by open TIF districts.220 This would 
seem to solve the problem as it gives schools no monetary incentive 
to opt-out of proposed TIFs. Yet, this temporary aid does not matter 
for the thesis of this Note. School aid to fill funding gaps is great 
and used in many locations.221 This school aid can offset the short 
term lost revenue from TIF projects, but TIF districts are, by design, 
temporally limited. The TIF district will eventually expire and this 
increased school aid will vanish along with it. At that point the 
school district will need to rely on whatever property tax revenue is 
brought in by the finished TIF development, and, as explained 
repeatedly throughout this Note, TIFs often do not create new 
property tax revenue. 
VII. Proposed Solution: Appointments Reallocation and 
Narrow School Opt-Outs 
 
There is no silver bullet to solve all of TIF’s problems. 
Hundreds of pages have been written on various issues with the 
current structure of TIFs in Missouri.222 Yet, Missouri has already 
demonstrated a willingness to meaningfully reform TIFs in a way 
 
 220. Schools Historically Have Little Power in TIF Decisions, JEFFERSON CITY 
NEWS TRIB. (Apr. 10, 2016), http://www.newstribune.com/news/story/story/2016/Ap
r/10/schools-historically-have-little-power-tif-decisio/546916/ [https://perma.cc/D5Q
G-S5XG] (“Some states provide additional state aid to districts with TIFs to 
replenish some of the revenue the district would otherwise receive from property 
taxes. However, Missouri does not make up for the revenue lost from TIFs, said 
Department of Elementary and Secondary Education spokesperson Sarah Potter.”). 
 221. Missouri Courts interpret the legislative intent of these state aid statutes to 
“at least partially equalize the relative disparity in wealth between affluent and less 
affluent school districts.” State ex rel. Sch. Dist. v. Young, 519 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1975). 
 222. See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 91, at 1019; Williams, supra note 91, at 255 
(discussing different issues plaguing Missouri’s TIF statute). 
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that bring them more in line with their original purpose.223 
However, the current reforms don’t go far enough. Furthermore, the 
proposed reforms in H.B. 31, in particular school-opt out, will 
further fuel unnecessary competition between municipalities, breed 
hostility between municipalities and school districts, and increase 
the resource gap between affluent and distressed school districts.224 
The 94th Missouri General Assembly clearly wanted to stifle 
competition between municipalities for TIFs when they instituted 
county-wide TIF commissions in the St. Louis metropolitan area.225 
However, the breakdown of the membership of these commissions 
skews heavily towards the county and municipalities, with few 
members coming from school districts or other services that receive 
property tax income.226 As it stands, these county TIF commissions 
have twelve members.227 The appointment of commissioners is as 
follows: six by the county executive, three by municipalities that 
utilize TIFs, two by the school boards of the county, and one by other 
agencies that receive property tax revenue.228 
Instead of adding more seats, appointments to the county TIF 
commissions should merely be reallocated. The county school 
boards should appoint four members instead of two, with the 
additional two seats being taken from the seats allocated to the 
county executive. This allocation more accurately recognizes the 
role of all of the interested players. The county is important and, as 
such, has the most seats. If going any further, one runs the risk of 
weakening the influence of the county too much, negating the entire 
purpose of the county TIF commission. Public schools receive most 
of their funding through property taxes.229 It makes sense, then, 
that when discussing the allocation of property tax revenue, the 
schools should have quite a bit of say. Having a full third of the 
county TIF commission seats grants them that authority while not 
allowing them to simply veto any TIF with which they disagree. 
Further, the seats allocated to the school districts should be 
split. Two of the seats should be appointed by affluent school 
 
 223. See discussion supra Section I.D. 
 224. See discussion supra Section IV.A.i. 
 225. H.B. 1, 94th General Assemb., 1st Sess. §§ 99.820.2(7)–(8) (Mo. 2008). 
 226. MO. ANN. STAT. § 99.820.3(1) (West 2016). 
 227. Id. §§ 99.820.3(1) (a)–(d). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See, e.g., PARKWAY SCH. DIST., COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 
7 (2015) (“The largest source of revenue for the District continues to be locally 
assessed property taxes.”). 
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districts and two by distressed school districts. How to demarcate 
“economic distress” would be up to the state. This increased school 
district representation, with increased diversity in who occupies the 
seats allocated to the school board, will give the schools increased 
say in how TIFs are administered while considering the needs of 
different kinds of school districts. This theory appears to be the 
rationale behind the school opt-out proposal in H.B. 31. 
This reallocation, however, does not share the same negative 
consequences of school opt-out.230 Reallocation provides school 
districts with more influence over how TIFs are approved while 
preventing them from single-handedly preventing any TIF they do 
not like. In addition, by ensuring there is diversity in type of school 
district represented, the county TIF commissions consider the needs 
of both affluent and distressed school districts without allowing one 
kind of district to overpower the other. 
Next, the ability of municipalities to veto the decision of a TIF 
commission should be further curtailed. If the municipality can 
easily veto a decision by the county TIF commission, then what’s 
the point? The Missouri General Assembly has already limited the 
power of the municipal veto by curtailing the use of TIF funds in 
the event a municipality vetoes.231 Simply abolishing the veto 
altogether would prove deeply controversial and appears to 
undermine TIF’s goal of local control over land redevelopment. 
Instead, keeping in mind Coleman and Murphy’s observation that 
the current two-thirds majority is too easy to attain, the bar for a 
municipality to veto the commission should be raised.232 Instead of 
a two-thirds majority, the municipality’s governing body must 
unanimously vote to override the county TIF commission’s 
recommendation. This structure makes overriding the county TIF 
commission’s recommendation difficult but not impossible. It also 
ensures that there is still a sense of local control over the TIF 
approval process.233 
 
230. Weber et al., supra note 53, at 35–36; see discussion supra Sections I.D,  
IV.A.i; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 12-1771(d) (2018). 
 231. H.B. 1434, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 99.825.2 (Mo. 2016); H.B. 1600, 
98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Sess. § 99.825.2 (Mo. 2016). 
 232. COLEMAN & MURPHY, supra note 42, at 11. 
 233. This reform might also persuade the county commissions to implement, 
without statutory changes, an increased blight standard for their own internal 
review of TIF proposals. This unilateral change in approval standards seems to be 
the underlying purpose of the county commissions in general. Message from Jay 
Nixon, Governor of Missouri, to the East-West Gateway Council of Governments 
(June 29, 2016) (on file with author). It is true that the county commissions could 
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Finally, county TIF commissions should be expanded to the 
Kansas City Metropolitan Area, in particular Jackson, Clay, and 
Platte counties. These three counties comprise most of the urban 
and suburban core of Kansas City within Missouri. As explained 
above, Kansas City has been less enthusiastic in their use of TIF 
funding for redevelopment which led to their exclusion from the 
2008 bill instituting county TIF commissions.234 It makes sense, 
though, for there to be consistency in Missouri’s TIF laws. In 
addition, a change in municipal governance might lead to more 
aggressive use of TIF districts in the Kansas City area. 
The second recommendation is to implement school opt-out in 
a far narrower sense than that proposed by H.B. 31. States like 
Minnesota grant only schools a veto power for only TIF proposals 
involving housing redevelopments.235 As these types of TIFs tend to 
be proposed in distressed municipalities, the power would primarily 
be wielded by distressed school districts.236 As such, this reform 
might narrow the resource gap. It would allow distressed school 
districts to forgo further economic development while using a steady 
stream of property tax revenue to improve the fiscal condition of 
their school district. Simply put, it gives fiscal control back to 
distressed school districts. 
It is important to emphasize what this Note is not advocating 
for. It is not advocating for the outright abolition of TIFs. TIFs, 
when done well, can make a marked change to an otherwise 
abandoned piece of property.237  They are intended to provide the 
 
simply do this now without the reform, but increased pressure from school-district-
appointed commission members might make it politically viable for the commission 
to adopt new standards when they review proposed TIFs. Under Mo. Stat. Section 
99.824.4(3), the county commission is either tasked with an up or down vote on the 
proposed TIF. There is no requirement to give a formal reason for the rejection. Id. 
While this meeting must be public, it allows for a potential solution to the tax blight 
and “but for” tests within the current statutory framework. Id. However, there is no 
current pressure for these commissions to change these standards. With more 
members appointed by school boards—in particular from distressed school 
districts—there might be enough internal and external pressure on the commissions 
to adopt new standards. 
 234. H.B. 1, 94th Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. §§ 99.820.2(7)–(8) (Mo. 2008). 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 134–136. 
 236. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 78. 
 237. See generally, ST. LOUIS INNOVATION DIST., ST. LOUIS INNOVATION DISTRICT 
TAX INCREMENT FINANCING (TIF) REDEVELOPMENT PLAN 3 (2012) (“Not only are 
structures in the Redevelopment Area old, but many are functionally obsolete. These 
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area supported by rail service, which no longer exists.”). Today this district has been 
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necessary economic spark to help areas grow and redevelop to suit 
the current economic environment. Yet, more often than not, TIFs 
are not done well. They have been abused by developers and 
municipalities stifling economic development in truly distressed 
areas. This abuse, though, does not warrant an extreme reaction 
like doing away with TIFs in general. In addition, TIFs are too 
popular with developers and municipalities to eliminate them.238 
Instead, it demands logical, simple reforms to the underlying TIF 
statutes that redistributes power from those with means to those 
without. Missouri has shown a desire to do this plan and the 
reforms proposed in this Note help further that goal. 
Conclusion 
TIFs are not inherently bad. They have been used for valid and 
important redevelopment projects.239 However, like many good 
things in the United States, municipalities and developers with 
deep pockets have exploited loopholes in the current statutes to 
their benefit. This practice comes at the expense of both 
economically distressed municipalities and school districts. There is 
no question Missouri’s TIF laws need reform, especially when it 
comes to the amount of say school districts have in the TIF approval 
process. However, reforms proposed in H.B. 31 simply do not 
address the underlying structural and economic stressors on the 
current TIF system. Instead of allowing all schools to opt-out of 
controversial TIF proposals, it would only realistically be an option 
for affluent school districts.240 This result, in turn, widens the 
resource gap between affluent and distressed school districts by 
allowing affluent school districts to only approve TIFs that provide 
a large enough return on investment. Further, school opt-out would 
only serve to further fracture an already fragmented region, 
possibly rendering any decision on TIF funding an impossible task. 
The two simple reforms proposed in this Note would lessen the 
problems plaguing the current TIF system in Missouri. The system 
would balance the need for school districts to have a say over where 
 
 238. See Coffin, supra note 78, at 60 (“While tax increment financing is considered 
a very effective (and popular) economic development tool, public officials often face 
difficulties in putting it to use.”) (emphasis added); Briffault, supra note 169, at 74 
(“One study of TIF in Indiana concluded that TIF may be the only politically 
acceptable tool for financing infrastructure.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 239. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 22. For example, the Cortex 
Redevelopment Plan in Midtown St. Louis has brought in almost 1,000 new jobs, 
$155 million in new investments and revitalized an entire neighborhood—all with 
only $10 million in TIF funding. LINCOLN REPORT, supra note 8, at 22 
 240. See discussion supra Section IV.B.i. 
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their funding is being sent with the needs of the municipalities to 
redevelop legitimately blighted land. It increases the power of 
economically distressed school districts to prevent overeager 
municipalities from making rash decisions to increase the 
municipality’s economic base to the detriment of the school district. 
And, most importantly, it accomlishes these goals without fueling 
an increase in the resource gap by redistributing some of the power 
from affluent to distressed school districts. 
TIFs have always been about power. Originally, they were 
about local power in the face of decreasing federal funds for urban 
redevelopment. Today, TIFs are about affluent regions using their 
economic power to centralize high-revenue multi-use developments 
within their municipal boundaries. These two proposed reforms 
help restore balance to that power. 
 
